Mythology of February 23: How Stalin transformed a disgraceful defeat into a "victory" celebration.

The history of "Day of the Soviet Army and Navy" is quite fascinating and has long been systematically analyzed. However, contemporary Russian historians who support Putin tend to avoid this topic. It's a tradition! As a result, the disgrace of the Soviet government and the complete defeat of the newly formed Red Army (RKKA) continue to be celebrated in Russia to this day.

…The Fourth year of World War I was underway. Following the Bolshevik coup in October 1917, the new authorities issued a series of decrees. Two of them—regarding peace and land—radically changed the situation at the front: the Russian army finally disintegrated. This process was not instantaneous; even under the Provisional Government, troops were retreating, refusing to fight, disorganized, and fraternizing with the enemy.

Soldiers, who were mostly peasants, began to protest with renewed vigor during the post-revolutionary winter, killing generals and officers, and seizing trains to return home to claim the "ten acres" promised by the Bolsheviks. The management of vast military contingents was completely disrupted. The scale of the catastrophic storm, the winds of which raged across vast territories during the winter of 1917-1918, is still hard to assess and comprehend today.

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This period was referred to by historians in the USSR as nothing less than the "triumphal march of Soviet power"! In reality, during this time, the Bolsheviks, desperate to maintain their power at all costs, began to "distribute" independence to the peripheries of the former empire. They recognized the independence of Poland (then occupied by the Germans) and Finland, which was on the brink of civil war between the Reds and the Whites. This conflict would conclude in May 1918 with the victory of Lenin's ideological opponents.

The situation with Ukraine, whose socialist government had finally abandoned its hopes for autonomy and proclaimed independence, was much more complicated. Russia simply could not envision its future without this granary, rich in industry and essential mineral resources.

Amidst the chaos and collapse of power structures, the Bolsheviks began peace negotiations with Kaiser Germany and Imperial Austria-Hungary as early as December 1917. A truce was signed on December 22. The government led by Vladimir Lenin was already prepared to sign a separate peace, but could not secure acceptable terms during the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk, dragging out the process.

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In the final stage of the negotiations, the delegation of Soviet Russia was headed by Leon Trotsky. On January 10, 1918, discussions began in that city between the Central Powers and the Central Rada delegation. Finally, on February 9, the Ukrainians signed the agreement. German and Austro-Hungarian troops were to assist in restoring the authority of the Ukrainian People's Republic, which had been squandered after bloody battles in eastern Ukraine and Kyiv. Let us remember the heroism of the defenders at Kruty and the capture of Ukraine's capital by the Red Army under Muravyov on February 8, unleashing a wave of terror in the city.

However, the Bolsheviks celebrated too soon over the defeat of the Ukrainian People's Republic forces. By February 10, 1918, negotiations between Soviet Russia and the Central Powers concluded without results. The Bolsheviks were consistently stalling for time. Leon Trotsky, then effectively the second-in-command in the Soviet government, returned to Petrograd. He did not comply with Lenin's demand to sign a peace treaty to save the republic at any cost. Trotsky shouted at Lenin: "The Germans will not advance!" He wanted to turn the situation around with the influential left opposition and continue the "revolutionary war," calling on German Social Democrats to join their Russian counterparts.

However, this was the fantasy of a dreamer. The Germans decided to act and launched an offensive on February 18, 1918, gradually liberating Ukraine from the Bolsheviks, capturing Belarus and the entire Baltic region. The advance was executed almost exclusively by train with minimal resistance from the Red Guards and minimal losses.

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What unfolded next was a thriller with elements of mythology. On February 23, the German Empire presented Soviet Russia with a harsh ultimatum demanding recognition of the independence of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, the signing of a peace treaty with Ukraine, as well as the demobilization of the army and disarmament of the navy. The Bolsheviks were required to withdraw troops from Finland and Ukraine. Early on the morning of February 24, the government—the All-Russian Central Executive Committee—accepted the ultimatum by a minimal majority (116 members in favor, 85 against, 26 abstained).

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Therefore, there was no crushing defeat of the Germans on February 23. Take a look at the well-crafted Soviet two-part film from 1970 titled "Red Square. Two Stories about the Workers' and Peasants' Army"—a vivid example of communist propaganda.

The glorified battles near Pskov and Narva, known from school textbooks, movies, and plays, simply could not have occurred on that day. According to the orders of the 53rd German Corps of Army Group "D," on February 23, the vanguard troops of the Kaiser Army were situated 55 km from Pskov and 170 km from Narva. There is no information about battles between them and the Red detachments, although the Germans were known for their meticulousness in military affairs.

In reality, a detachment of 1,000 fighters (Baltic Fleet sailors commanded by native of Chernigov Pavel Dybenko and internationalists led by Hungarian Bela Kun) approached Narva, which the Germans had not yet occupied, only at the end of February. In their first encounter with regular Kaiser troops, the detachment was routed and forced to flee Narva. Ukrainian philosopher and historian Peter Kralyuk noted: "In reality, neither the Germans nor the Bolsheviks intended to fight each other. The former needed to demonstrate that they were advancing. The latter needed to show that they were incapable of defending the Russian capital. Therefore, they had to proceed with signing a humiliating peace treaty."

Lieutenant General Dmitry Parski, who had participated in the Russo-Japanese and World War I and had joined the Reds in early 1918, wrote: "...the abandonment of Narva occurred primarily because there was no unified leadership and communication during the actions, because poorly or almost completely unprepared units were introduced into battle ineptly, and they suffered excessive losses (the sailors bore the brunt of the losses), finally, the mood of the troops was perhaps influenced by the then position of being between war and peace, which unsettled people and contributed to a decrease in their resilience."

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A nearly identical situation developed in Pskov. The only instance of resistance against the Germans was the fierce opposition of the Latvian riflemen. The overwhelming majority of deserters from the front did not wish to defend Soviet power and continued to panic flee home. Regarding the capture of Pskov by the Kaiser's forces on February 26, 1918, one of the commanders of the Northern Front of the Red Army, Boris Pozern, wrote: "The city was taken by a small force of Germans. Our misfortune lies in the lack of preparation, as well as the fact that no orders can change a pre-prepared mood—not to continue the war."

On March 3, under new, harsher conditions, Soviet Russia signed the Brest Peace Treaty.

…The remnants of Dybenko's detachment were disarmed. Many newspapers reported on this disgraceful flight. Lenin ordered Dybenko to be tried for the surrender of Narva. On March 16, he was arrested and removed from his position as the People's Commissar for Maritime Affairs. On March 25, he was released on bail due to the ultimatum from the Baltic states and effectively fled to Samara under the pretext of organizing resistance against the forces of Ataman Alexander Dutov.

The Soviet government declared the necessity of arresting the unfortunate commander. He returned on March 26 to the new capital of Soviet Russia—Moscow. In May, a trial was held, during which he was expelled from the VKP(b) but acquitted "due to inexperience in military affairs." Some researchers note that he was found guilty and sentenced to death but was pardoned at the behest of his wife, Alexandra Kollontai (Domontovich)—a well-known and influential Bolshevik.

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In 1922, Dybenko was reinstated in the party, and his military career advanced rapidly. However, the end of the 2nd rank commander was quite typical for the Stalin era: the "hero of February 23" received a bullet in the back of his head at the infamous Komunarika firing range near Moscow.

And the victorious date was invented by Joseph Stalin, although celebrations of the "victory" at Narva and Pskov took place a year later, in 1919. The Kremlin tyrant greatly enjoyed pompous festivities. The myth first appeared in an article published in "Izvestia" on February 16, 1938, titled "On the 20th Anniversary of the RKKA